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‘RELATIONAL PRIVACY’ & TORT
STUART HARGREAVES*
ABSTRACT
This Article argues that the current interpretation given to the
four-part invasion of privacy framework by the courts is inadequate
in the face of modern privacy challenges. In particular, it struggles
with claims for privacy over public matters or other ‘non-secret’
matters that an individual may nonetheless have some ongoing
privacy interest in. This Article suggests that this struggle is the
result of the courts adopting a fixed, binary approach to privacy,
which is itself grounded in a liberal-individualistic account of auton-
omy. While this may be a natural response to concerns about limit-
ing the scope of the tort, it is unnecessarily rigid. Feminist legal
theory offers a reconstructed account of autonomy grounded in the
importance of supportive social contexts rather than the elimination
of external influences. This Article argues that the deep philosophi-
cal linkages between autonomy and privacy mean that by drawing
on this reconstructed account of the former we can improve our
approach to the latter. In turn, this points towards a legal regime
that protects privacy not by focusing on a priori definitions of pri-
vate places or things, but by focusing on the nature of the harm
suffered by the claimant and its impact upon their role in the com-
munity. Though the courts have not yet recognized this approach by
name, this Article suggests that the seeds of it can be found in the
expansion of the breach of confidence action used in some common
law jurisdictions to protect privacy interests. This expansion has
taken an action previously applicable only in the commercial con-
text, and by focusing on the nature of the harm suffered by the
claimant, has expanded privacy protections in a way that may in fact
be more responsive to a range of modern privacy claims than the
traditional freestanding privacy torts used in the United States and
replicas of them elsewhere.
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INTRODUCTION
Tort as a vehicle to protect privacy can be traced to Warren &
Brandeis’ seminal article that feared an emboldened tabloid press
along with new photographic technology might “make good the pre-
diction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed
from the house-tops.’”1 In these developments they foresaw a growing
threat to an individual’s “inviolate personality,” and so advocated
for legal recognition of the right to be “let alone.” 2 The ideas con-
tained in “The Right to Privacy” were gradually adopted by the courts
and seventy-five years later Prosser argued (critically, it should be
noted) that the common law of the United States had subsequently
expanded to reveal four distinct privacy-related torts: intrusion upon
the plaintiff’s solitude, seclusion or private affairs; public disclosure
of embarrassing facts about the plaintiff; publicity that places the
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and appropriation of the
plaintiff’s name or likeness.3 While there was (and is) debate as to
whether these actions are in fact distinctly related to privacy,4 this
four-part approach is now widespread thanks to its inclusion in the
Second Restatement of Torts, which reads:
(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is
subject to liability for the resulting harm to the inter-
ests of the other.
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by[:]
1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 195 (1890) (quoting Luke 12:3).
2. Id. at 205.
3. William L. Prosser, Privacy [A Legal Analysis], in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS
OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 107 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984).
4. Prosser contended, for instance, that while the American common law had evolved
this way, none of these four torts were truly related to a distinct understanding of pri-
vacy; rather, each protected separate interests such as mental distress (the intrusion
tort), reputation (the disclosure and publicity torts), or property (the appropriation tort).
Id. at 105. In contrast, Bloustein has argued that invasion of privacy ought to be con-
ceived of as a single dignitary tort. See Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of
Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY:
AN ANTHOLOGY 157 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984).
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(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of
another, as stated in § 652B; or
(b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness,
as stated in § 652C; or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s
private life, as stated in § 652D; or
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other
in a false light before the public, as stated in
§ 652E.5
Two of these branches—unreasonable intrusion upon the seclu-
sion of another and unreasonable publicity given to another’s private
life—may in theory apply to a variety of privacy concerns. However,
the current approach to protecting privacy under this framework is
an impoverished one, flowing from a conceptual dependence upon
the metaphor of a boundary that delineates that which is ‘public’
and that which is ‘private.’ This a priori requirement is ill-suited to
a range of modern privacy claims, particularly for those that may
have some kind of online aspect to them, in which the lines between
what is ‘private’ and what is ‘public’ may be heavily blurred. I argue
in this Article that this boundary metaphor characterizes the liberal
account of privacy in tort law because it flows from a very similar
metaphor that informs the liberal account of autonomy—both imag-
ine the individual protecting his or her ‘privacy’ or ‘autonomy’ from
the unwanted influence of others with a ‘shield’ in the form of ac-
tionable legal rights. By drawing upon accounts of autonomy that
challenge this conventional approach (in particular those found in
feminist legal theory), I offer an improved normative account of
privacy: ‘relational privacy.’
Relational privacy contends a true state of privacy can—par-
adoxically—only itself be meaningfully achieved within a dense
network of relationships. On this account, a privacy loss is some-
thing that lessens our ability to engage others or modulate our
exposure within this network of relationships. In turn, the most
serious privacy losses (and thus the ones that should be legally
actionable) are those that significantly impinge upon the ability of
the individual to act in an autonomous manner and function as a
member of a community in the way they see fit. I argue that privacy
understood on this relational basis can provide a superior normative
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (AM. LAW INST. 1977). It should, of
course, be noted that while Restatements are strongly authoritative they are of course
not binding; because tort is the domain of state law, not all states have accepted all four
elements of Prosser’s formulation into their respective common laws.
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framework upon which tort protections can subsequently be grafted.
Though no courts have explicitly adopted a relational approach to
privacy, I conclude by suggesting that the approach taken in some
non-U.S. jurisdictions to protecting privacy interests in tort not
through a freestanding ‘invasion of privacy’ action but rather by
extending the ‘breach of confidence’ action represents the seeds of
such an approach.
I. PRIVACY TORTS & THE METAPHOR OF THE BOUNDARY
At the outset, one must acknowledge that the existing public/
private dichotomy that characterizes the current tort framework is
essentially a judicial response to an admitted problem. Austin de-
scribes the phenomenon of “containment anxiety,” whereby courts
resist extension of tort protections for invasions of privacy out of a
fear of unduly restricting the legitimate interests of other parties.6
An invasion of privacy tort that could successfully ground claims for
secrecy over any activity an individual wished to keep out of the
public eye, for instance, would have serious consequences for the
constitutionally protected expressive activities of others. The juris-
prudence surrounding the existing privacy tort framework reveals
some of this ‘anxiety.’ Take, for instance, the unreasonable intrusion
upon seclusion branch, under which the interpretation of the courts
given to the tort has an important locational aspect:
[The plaintiff’s] den was a sphere from which he could reasonably
expect to exclude eavesdropping newsmen. . . . [While one] takes a
risk that the visitor may not be what he seems, and that the visitor
may repeat all he hears and observes when he leaves . . . . [one]
does not and should not be required to take the risk that what
is heard and seen will be transmitted by photograph or recording,
or in our modern world, in full living color and hi-fi to the public
at large or to any segment of it that the visitor may select.7
The defendant need not physically penetrate the zone of pri-
vacy; even if the defendant is nowhere near the plaintiff at the time
the intrusion is alleged to have occurred, the use of certain kinds of
equipment—like parabolic microphones—may still violate the plain-
tiff’s privacy rights if the plaintiff was located in an a priori private
place, such as a bedroom.8 This logic also means wiretapping a
6. Lisa M. Austin, Privacy and Private Law: The Dilemma of Justification, 55 MCGILL
L.J. 165, 167–68 (2010).
7. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971).
8. Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 241–42 (N.H. 1964).
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telephone conversation can ground a claim for intrusion upon seclu-
sion even if the ‘bug’ itself is not located within the target’s private
space.9 What is important, then, is the location of the plaintiff in
some erstwhile private zone, rather than the method used to pene-
trate that zone.10 ‘Intrusions’ are not limited only to the ‘physical’
variety, but also include ‘electronic’ intrusions; “[s]imply put intru-
sion is a physical, electronic or mechanical intrusion into someone’s
personal life.”11
The flipside of this approach means that courts have been
extremely reluctant to find that any kind of privacy interest has
been invaded when the plaintiffs are in public space or otherwise
easily accessible by others—in other words, outside the a priori
determined ‘zone of privacy.’ In Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., the
plaintiffs sued a newspaper for intrusion upon seclusion after a
photograph taken of them in an “affectionate pose” while at an ice
cream stand at the Los Angeles Farmers’ Market was published.12
By virtue of being in public the couple had, according to the court,
“voluntarily exposed themselves to public gaze in a pose open to the
view of any persons who might then be at or near their place of
business. . . . [and thus had] waived their right of privacy.”13 In
Villanova, a plaintiff sued under the first branch after private
investigators used a hidden GPS device to track his movements by
car on the orders of his wife as part of their divorce proceedings.14
The court concluded that even though the placement of the device
was done without the plaintiff’s knowledge, the consistent tracking
of his location was not an intrusion upon his seclusion or solitude
because he never drove the car to a secluded location or place that
was out of public view.15 Again, the ‘public’ aspect of the plaintiff’s
activities meant no claim for privacy could be sustained.16 Thus,
while a physical intrusion of a private place by the defendant is not
necessary to create a cause of action within the first branch of the
tort, the plaintiff must still be located in places a priori determined
to be deserving of a claim to ‘seclusion.’17 Effectively, this is a spatial
9. Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 770 (N.Y. 1970).
10. See id.
11. Brian Kane, Balancing Anonymity, Popularity, & Micro-Celebrity: The Crossroads
of Social Networking & Privacy, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 327, 349 (2010).
12. Gill v. Hearst Publ’g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 442 (Cal. 1953).
13. Id. at 444.
14. Villanova v. Innovative Investigations, Inc., 21 A.3d 650, 651 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2011).
15. Id. at 651–52.
16. Id. at 656–57.
17. Id. at 656.
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question dependent on a boundary between public and private places
with the result that acting in public essentially dooms any claim to
privacy under the first branch of the four-part framework.
A similar spatial emphasis is revealed in the jurisprudence
under the third branch of the tort (publicity given to the private life
of another). Though a defendant may be liable for the publication of
information that “[was] not of legitimate concern to the public,”18
there is an important escape hatch for defendants in that “there is
no liability for giving further publicity to what the plaintiff himself
leaves open to the public eye.”19 The meaning of ‘public eye’ has been
given a broad ambit by the courts. Puckett, for instance, involved a
dancer at a strip club who was filmed without her consent and had
her image broadcast (though not identified by name) as part of a
news segment on a particularly notorious bar in Tennessee.20 She
alleged that the broadcast invaded her privacy through the public
revelation of private facts, as it revealed to her unknowing friends
and family that she was an exotic dancer.21 In dismissing her ap-
peal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals did not find it necessary to
make recourse to the fact that the news segment might have re-
vealed information that was of ‘legitimate concern to the public’ or
to any constitutional arguments regarding freedom of the press.22
Instead, the court simply concluded that since “[the] plaintiff’s
activities at the club were open to the public. . . . her claim for public
disclosure of private life was properly dismissed by the district court
as a matter of law.” 23 So, even though the plaintiff was located in
private property, the fact that it was generally open to members of
the public (at least, those of the age of majority) was enough to mean
it was not deemed a truly ‘private’ location.24
The importance of this a priori determination of public and
private places is further solidified by the interpretation given to the
other major containment tool found in both the first and third
branches of the tort—that the invasion or publicity be ‘highly offen-
sive to the reasonable person.’ Returning to Gill, the court implied
there was an important connection between the locational element
of the alleged tort (the Farmers’ Market) and whether or not it was
an invasion that was, in fact, ‘highly offensive’ to the reasonable
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (Am. Law Inst. 1977).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. B (Am. Law Inst. 1977).
20. Puckett v. American Broad. Co. Inc., No. 89-6589, 1990 WL 170425, at *1 (6th
Cir. Nov. 6, 1990).
21. Id. at *2.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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person.25 While the plaintiffs were photographed linked arm-in-arm
in a fashion that might be considered an intimate gesture, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court ruled that revealing it in the photograph was
not found to meet the ‘highly offensive’ threshold, as it was merely
the portrayal of “an incident which may be seen almost daily in
ordinary life.” 26 In so doing, the court linked the location of the
‘incident’ and its possible offensiveness; this serves to further privi-
lege the initial spatial question. Boring also turned largely on this
issue of the lack of ‘offensiveness’ of things that can be easily seen
publicly.27 After discovering photos of their residence on Google’s
Street View mapping project despite it being at the end of a private,
unpaved road, Aaron and Christine Boring filed suit claiming that
Google had “significantly disregarded [their] privacy interests.” 28
Though the Borings had failed to state in their brief precisely which
privacy interest under the four-part framework was violated, the
District Court concluded that the only possible options were intru-
sion upon seclusion and publicity given to private life, and proceeded
accordingly.29 Regarding the requirement of high offensiveness
under both these branches of the tort, the court argued that while
many people might resent some of the privacy implications of Street
View, only “the most exquisitely sensitive would suffer shame or
humiliation.” 30 The Borings, the court said, had failed to bring evi-
dence that would demonstrate the reasonable person would be
highly offended that images of their house were available online,
and even the Borings themselves had not taken the necessary steps
(such as requesting a takedown) with Google to begin eliminating
the images.31 The court also suggested that the way in which the
Borings had brought suit against Google was evidence that privacy
was not their primary concern and that they did not find the images
highly offensive or humiliating—truly private people, the court rea-
soned, would not have begun a lawsuit without obtaining orders to
seal the pleadings.32 By not doing so, information about the Borings
(and images of their house) rapidly disseminated through the media
once the lawsuit began.33 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reached
25. Gill v. Hearst Publ’g Co., 253 P.2d 441, 444–45 (Cal. 1953).
26. Id. at 445.
27. Boring v. Google, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 695, 700 (W.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d 369 F.
App’x 273 (3d Cir. 2010).
28. Id. at 699.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 700.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. Boring, 598 F. Supp. at 700.
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the same determination with regard to both branches of the tort,
finding that, “[n]o person of ordinary sensibilities would be shamed,
humiliated, or have suffered mentally as the result of a vehicle
entering into his or her ungated driveway and photographing the
view from there. . . . [t]he alleged conduct would not be highly offen-
sive to a person of ordinary sensibilities.” 34 As Strahilevitz suggests,
then, the general principle drawn from the American jurisprudence
is that “[public matters cannot] provide the plaintiff with a cause of
action” when it comes to the invasion of privacy framework.35 This
is true under both the first and third branches of the tort, and
operates at both an a priori level and as a factor going to the ‘offen-
siveness’ of the alleged intrusion upon seclusion or publicity given
to private facts.
Importantly, this approach resonates outside the American con-
text since the United States was the first common law jurisdiction
to adopt freestanding (that is, not dependent on another recognized
cause of action) privacy torts.36 The technique of ‘containing’ the tort
through requiring any invasion of privacy to be ‘highly offensive’
and the virtual impossibility of public (or publicized) affairs or
matters being considered as such has significantly influenced the
development of invasion of privacy torts in other jurisdictions. Take
for instance Hosking, in which the New Zealand Court of Appeal
adopted the third branch of the American invasion of privacy frame-
work (including the ‘highly offensive’ threshold test) to address a claim
for privacy in public.37 The plaintiffs (a ‘celebrity couple’) sought to
restrain the publication of photographs of the wife and their eighteen-
month-old twins taken without their knowledge while in public; the
action was brought against both the photographer and the owner of
the magazine that had commissioned the photographer and pub-
lished the photo.38 Since this was the first time a New Zealand court
had recognized an invasion of privacy tort at common law, the issue
of containment naturally arose and the Court chose to limit the scope
of the tort in two ways. First, the Court required that the informa-
tion itself was of the type over which an individual had a reasonable
34. Boring v. Google Inc., 362 F. App’x 273, 279–80 (3d Cir. 2010).
35. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
919, 920 (2005).
36. Cf. Hosking v. Runting [2004] NZCA 34 at [14] (N.Z.) (discussing a review of
authorities from other countries).
37. Id. at paras. 120, 126–27. In Hosking, the New Zealand Court of Appeals also con-
cluded it was unnecessary for them to decide at that moment “whether a tortious remedy
should be available in New Zealand law for unreasonable intrusion into a person’s solitude
or seclusion” (that is, the f irst branch of the American privacy tort). Id. at para. 118.
38. Id. at para. 1.
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expectation of privacy; and second, that the disclosure of the infor-
mation was “highly offensive.” 39 The Court found that “[t]he photo-
graphs taken . . . [did] not disclose anything more than could have
been observed by any member of the public in Newmarket on that
particular day” and therefore publication would not reveal “any fact
in respect of which there could be a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.” 40 Thus, while adopting the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’
phrasing that is rarely found in the U.S. privacy tort jurisprudence,
the New Zealand Court of Appeal nonetheless effectively adopted
the first principle’s elimination of public affairs from the ambit of a
tort in a fashion that generally matches the approach taken under
the third branch of the American framework.
In Canada, the Ontario Court of Appeal has also drawn explicit
inspiration from the American privacy tort framework. In Jones v.
Tsige, the defendant improperly accessed the plaintiff’s financial
records (they were co-workers at a bank) on at least 174 occasions
over two years.41 Though no Canadian jurisdiction had previously
adopted a freestanding common law privacy tort, Sharpe, J.A., argued
that the time had come to do so and that the four-part American ap-
proach was a useful starting point.42 He concluded that the facts in
Jones lent themselves to consideration under the “intrusion upon
seclusion” or into private affairs’ branch.43 The “key features” of the
action in Ontario are now (1) intentional conduct by the defendant,
(2) which results in the invasion of the plaintiff’s private affairs with-
out lawful justification, and that (3) a reasonable person would con-
sider the invasion to be highly offensive.44 Though the facts of Jones
meant the case did not depend on an a priori determination of
private space, Sharpe, J.A., suggested that the new tort would only
apply to a limited number of a priori determined private information:
Claims from individuals who are sensitive or unusually con-
cerned about their privacy are excluded: it is only intrusions into
matters such as one’s financial or health records, sexual prac-
tices and orientation, employment, diary or private correspondence
that, viewed objectively on the reasonable person standard, can
be described as highly offensive.45
39. Id. at para. 42.
40. Id. at para. 164.
41. Jones v. Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32, paras. 2–3 (Can.).
42. Id. at para. 23.
43. Id. at para. 21.
44. Id. at para. 71.
45. Id. at para. 72.
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Like its American counterpart, then, the invasion of privacy tort
adopted in Ontario uses the question of ‘offensiveness’ as a means
of limiting the scope of the tort, and appears to do so at least in part
through the adoption of a similar boundary dividing certain ‘private’
matters from those that are ‘public.’ Only invasion into those mat-
ters that are preemptively accepted to be ‘private’ will be considered
‘highly offensive,’ and the nature or extent of the harm suffered by
the plaintiff is relevant only at the stage of determining the quan-
tum of damages.46
Though Jones marked the first recognition in the Canadian com-
mon law of an invasion of privacy tort,47 four Canadian provinces
had previously created privacy torts through statute (British Colum-
bia,48 Manitoba,49 Saskatchewan,50 Newfoundland & Labrador51).
Unlike the common law version adopted in Jones, the statutory torts
do not replicate any part of the four-part American framework.
Instead they rely upon the looser concept of the plaintiff’s ‘reason-
able expectation of privacy,’ which is dependent upon the “nature,
incidence and occasion of the . . . conduct [in question].” 52 Though
there is no explicit exclusion of activities occurring in public within
the text of the statutes, the jurisprudence nonetheless suggests a
similar privileging of spatial questions as found in the American
cases.53 Canadian courts have concluded that “there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy for actions taking place in public;” 54 a per-
son’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her own home is
ordinarily very high whereas in a public place it is substantially less
so;55 and that “overt actions and behaviours occurring in public are
not really ‘private’ . . . at all.” 56 Though other cases under the pro-
vincial courts have acknowledged that a claim to privacy might
extend to the immediate vicinity of the home, it still does not extend
to public space in general.57
46. Id. at paras. 71, 87.
47. See also discussion infra notes 277–87 and accompanying text.
48. Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 373 (Can.).
49. The Privacy Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. P.125 (Can.).
50. The Privacy Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. P-24 (Can.).
51. The Privacy Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. P-22 (Can.).
52. Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 373, s.1(1)(3) (Can.). Common phrasing is found in
all four of the provincial statutory privacy torts.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 7–24.
54. Milner v. Mfr.’s Life Ins., 2005 BCSC 1661, para. 77 (Can.).
55. Id. at paras. 76–77.
56. Druken v. Fewer (R.G.) & Assoc., Inc., 1998 CanLII 18731, para. 43 (Can. N.L.
S.C.T.D.).
57. See Wasserman v. Hall, 2009 BCSC 1318, para. 90 (Can.) (aff irming a right to
privacy in one’s backyard); Heckert v. 5470 Investments Ltd., 2008 BCSC 1298, para. 86
(Can.) (aff irming a right to privacy in the hallway of one’s apartment building).
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The general lack of protection for privacy interests in public
under the Canadian provincial statutory torts is confirmed by cases
that relate to privacy claims over particular information that has
been, for whatever reason, brought into the public realm.58 For
instance, information that has previously been the subject of legal
proceedings is also considered to be ‘publicly available,’ and thus
outside the ambit of the tort.59 This is in some way a parallel to the
principle that guides the interpretation of the third branch of the
American tort. In Mohl, for instance, the plaintiff launched an in-
vasion of privacy claim against the respondent university after it
acknowledged to the media that the plaintiff had failed a teaching
practicum while registered as a student there.60 The plaintiff had
earlier commenced court actions against the university in an attempt
to have the failing mark overturned, leading the Court of Appeal to
conclude that “once [a] person starts a court action, matters that
were once private can cease to be so.”61 While this result may not seem
particularly surprising, what counts as the ‘public realm’ has been
interpreted widely. This was perhaps most striking in Milton, in
which the plaintiff sought damages under British Columbia’s ver-
sion of the tort after the defendant circulated a nude photo of the
plaintiff that she had left in a borrowed jacket.62 The court concluded
that the plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of privacy over the photo-
graph was eliminated when she failed to initially ask for the photo-
graph to be returned upon discovering it was in the defendant’s
possession, and because she had willingly shared the photograph
with an unknown developer in Hawaii in order to get prints.63
In various jurisdictions, then, we can see a zonal or boundary
approach to privacy claims in tort, in which even matters which may
have once attracted a privacy interest can no longer ground a claim
once they are brought into the public eye. While conceptually rela-
tively easy (and thus no doubt tempting) for the courts to apply,
such an approach is nonetheless largely unhelpful in remedying a
range of modern privacy losses that increasingly revolve around the
kinds of personal information that individuals may choose to share
in one context but not another. In the sections that follow, I tie this
approach to a similar account of autonomy within liberal thought,
and then argue for a reconceived approach that draws from feminist
58. See Mohl v. University of British Columbia, 2009 BCCA 249, para. 19 (Can.);
Mohl v. University of British Columbia, 2008 BCSC 1234, paras. 12–13 (Can.).
59. See Mohl, 2009 BCCA 249, para. 19 (Can.).
60. Mohl, 2009 BCCA 249, at para. 5.
61. Mohl, 2008 BCCA 1234, at para. 11.
62. Milton v. Savinkoff, 1993 CanLII 169, 1–2 (B.C. S.C.).
63. Id. at 5–6.
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legal theory. Such a reconception, I suggest, can better ground a tort
framework that can appropriately respond to a wider range of mod-
ern privacy claims.
II. AUTONOMY, PRIVACY, & THE METAPHOR OF THE BOUNDARY
The value of autonomy is central to liberal thought, in which
“[t]o be autonomous . . . is seen by many as the very core of a valu-
able human existence.” 64 The autonomous actor lies at the heart of
liberal individualism writ large: a rational, rights-bearing citizen
pursuing her interpretation of the good life.65 Anderson and Honneth
identify autonomy as one of liberalism’s “core commitments,” tracing
it to the early modern period of European history during which, they
argue, individuals increasingly abandoned social and community
bonds in pursuit of their own goals.66 Yet despite (or perhaps be-
cause of) its importance to broad liberal political theory, it remains
a contested concept.67 Indeed, there is probably no universal ideal of
‘autonomy,’ but rather “one concept and many conceptions.” 68 How-
ever, Christman notes that while there may indeed be multiple
ways to approach autonomy in terms of defining its boundaries,
functions, or effects, its conceptual core is that to be autonomous is
to have the psychological ability of self-governance.69 Dworkin concurs,
seeing the shared element of diverse approaches to autonomy as a
“certain idea of persons [being] self-determining.” 70 Indeed, the ety-
mology of the word itself points to the abstract notion that underpins
it: derived from the Greek roots of autos, meaning ‘self,’ and nomos,
meaning ‘law’ or ‘rule,’ autonomy’s literal meaning therefore is “the
having or making of one’s own law.” 71 “[T]he notion of autonomy
still finds its core meaning in the idea of being one’s own person,
directed by considerations, desires, conditions, and characteristics
that are not simply imposed externally on one, but are part of what
can somehow be considered one’s authentic self.” 72
64. John Philip Christman, Introduction, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDI-
VIDUAL AUTONOMY 18 (John Christman ed., 1989).
65. Id. at 18–19.
66. Joel Anderson & Axel Honneth, Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and
Justice, in AUTONOMY AND THE CHALLENGES TO LIBERALISM: NEW ESSAYS 127–28 (John
Christman & Joel Anderson eds., 2005).
67. PAUL B. CLARKE, AUTONOMY UNBOUND 11 (1999).
68. Gerald Dworkin, The Concept of Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON
INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 57 (John Christman ed., 1989).
69. Christman, supra note 64, at 5.
70. GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 9 (1988).
71. Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTON-
OMY 27 (John Christman ed., 1989).
72. John Christman & Joel Anderson, Introduction, in AUTONOMY AND THE CHAL-
LENGES OF LIBERALISM: NEW ESSAYS 3 (John Christman & Joel Anderson eds., 2005).
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Dworkin believes that autonomy can be thought of (and used)
“as a moral, political, and social ideal.” 73 Morally, it suggests that
there is some benefit to having individuals choose or adopt their
own moral code, and so individuals ought to have the capacity to
subject themselves to objective moral principles.74 Politically, it can
be used as a means of arguing against any kind of institutional
composition that attempts to impose upon citizens a particular set
of ends or values.75 For example, democratic mechanisms consistent
with the value of autonomy likely do not depend on conformity with
a particular religious or cultural tradition before allowing participa-
tion.76 Socially, it can be thought of as the idea that one has the
ability to choose one’s own conception of the good life.77 Christman
and Anderson, for example, describe personal autonomy as a “trait
that individuals can exhibit relative to any aspects of their lives,” 78
while for Raz it is “the vision of people controlling, to some degree,
their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions.” 79
Christman and Anderson also suggest that in order for the
individual to achieve ‘autonomy’ or to be able to govern oneself,
what is required is that the individual be able to “act competently”
and that those actions stem from desires that are their own.80 In
turn, this requires that two sets of conditions—‘competency condi-
tions’ and ‘authenticity conditions’—be met.81 To meet the compe-
tency conditions, they claim an individual must have the capacity
for rational thought, self-control, and self-understanding, and be free
from coercion in exercising those capacities.82 Meeting the authen-
ticity conditions requires the capacity to reflect upon and endorse
one’s desires, values, or wishes.83 Such procedural autonomy can be
seen as something approaching an equation of independence (mean-
ing a lack of overt coercion) plus the ability for self-reflection.
Dworkin too suggests an account of autonomy based on “procedural
independence,” which for him is composed of two things.84 First, that
the individual be free from manipulation or deception in the arrival
of their ‘first-order’ desires (those simple desires to do or not to do
73. DWORKIN, supra 70, at 10.
74. Id. at 11.
75. Id. at 10.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 11.
78. Christman & Anderson, supra note 72, at 2.
79. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369 (1986).
80. Christman & Anderson, supra note 72, at 3.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. DWORKIN, supra note 70, at 20.
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things—a wish to travel, a desire to marry, a decision to work as a
teacher instead of as a nurse, etc.).85 Kupfer describes such first-
order considerations as those that underlie the decisions that “oc-
cupy us in the ordinary course of life.” 86 The second (and crucial)
element for Dworkin is the existence of “second-order” actions, or
those that are used to reflect upon first-order desires; these second-
order capacities parallel the authenticity and competence conditions
mentioned above.87 Second-order actions or judgments involve a
degree of critical self-reflection, in which individuals consider the
implementation of their first-order desires.88 This process of consid-
eration enables them to choose which first-order desires to follow
and which ones to reject, and in what order.89 For Dworkin, the key
element of autonomy is this critical reflective capacity, along with
a secondary capacity to change or at least attempt to change those
first-order desires in light of the higher-order reflection.90 Crittenden
also suggests that to be “self-ruled . . . one must be able to step back
reflectively from her social context to evaluate critically the norms
and standards and ends of that context.” 91 By reflecting in this
manner, “persons define their nature, give meaning and coherence
to their lives, and take responsibility for the kind of person they
are.” 92 Richards concurs, suggesting that “[a]utonomy . . . is a com-
plex assumption about the capacities . . . of persons, which enable
them to develop, want to act on, and act on higher-order plans of
action which take as their self-critical object one’s life and the way
it is lived.” 93
So in the liberal tradition, autonomy is vital—but how is it to
be ensured? Primarily by protecting the individual from outside
influence.94 Anderson and Honneth suggest it “increases with the
reduction of restrictions . . . [so] individuals realize their autonomy
by gaining independence from their consociates.” 95 Fairfield argues
that “[a]s a philosophy profoundly committed to human freedom, one
of liberalism’s principal concerns [is] to safeguard private life from
85. See id.
86. JOSEPH H. KUPFER, AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 26 (1990).
87. DWORKIN, supra note 70, at 20.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Jack Crittenden, The Social Nature of Autonomy, 55 REV. OF POL. 35, 43 (1993).
92. DWORKIN, supra note 70, at 20.
93. David A.J. Richards, Rights and Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON
INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 205 (John Christman ed., 1989).
94. See Anderson & Honneth, supra note 66, at 128.
95. Id.
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undue intrusion by public institutions.” 96 For Dworkin, autonomy is
dependent upon a “self which is to be respected, left unmanipulated,
and which is, in certain ways, independent and self-determining.” 97
On the traditional liberal account then, personal autonomy is a quality
held by the rational actor, able to act free from outside influences in
considering his or her options, determining which of those is the
most suitable vehicle for advancing their primary desires, and then
acting successfully upon that determination. Friedman’s practical
gloss is that “[p]ersonal autonomy involves acting and living accord-
ing to one’s own choices, values, and identity, within the constraints
of what one regards as morally permissible.” 98 The focus on a lack
of restrictions (Anderson and Honneth), prevention of intrusion
(Fairfield), freedom from manipulation (Dworkin), and acting as one
chooses (Friedman) all imply the necessity of a ‘barrier’—in the form
of ‘rights’—that protects the individual from the encroachment of
the collective. “The tradition[al] . . . [concept of autonomy] sets [it]
in opposition to collective power. . . . to shield individuals from the
collective, to set up legal barriers around the individual the state
cannot cross . . . .” 99
This account of personal autonomy—both its normative content
(growth/protection of the self) and the mechanism by which it is to
be guaranteed (a barrier against the collective in the form of legal
rights)—deeply informs the liberal account of privacy. Consider, for
instance, the idea that privacy can help protect or promote
‘personhood’ or ensure space for necessary self-development. It was
at the heart of Warren and Brandeis’ interpretation of the right to
privacy, which they justified as necessary in order to protect the
individual’s “inviolate personality.”100 While they did not explicitly
define what this personality was, it is suggestive of some vital core
of the self.101 A number of privacy scholars agree with this general
notion, though not necessarily using the same phrasing, or entirely
agreeing on what precisely the ‘core’ of a person is.102 Bloustein, for
one, believes that “inviolate personality” is “the individual’s inde-
pendence, dignity and integrity [which] defines man’s essence as a
96. PAUL FAIRFIELD, PUBLIC/PRIVATE 5 (2005).
97. DWORKIN, supra note 70, at 11–12 (emphasis added).
98. Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy, Social Disruption, and Women, in RELATIONAL
AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF 37
(Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000).
99. Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities,
1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 13 (1989).
100. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205.
101. See id.
102. See, e.g., Bloustein, supra note 4, at 186–88.
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unique and self-determining being”103 and that “[this] in some sense
a spiritual interest rather than an interest in property or reputa-
tion.”104 Fairfield suggests that privacy secures us against “unwanted
intrusions into areas of life that . . . profoundly touch on who we are
and what meaning our lives hold for us.”105 Schoeman also believes
that, in general, the protection of the self is a desirable thing and
that privacy “marks out something morally significant about what
it is to be a person.”106 He argues that privacy allows individuals to
express the different dimensions of the self, not in the sense of
multiple-personality disorders, but rather in the sense that behav-
iour is not consistent, and shifts across contexts.107 Austin, too,
argues “we require some respite” from the public gaze not only so
that we may act in unconventional ways, but simply in order that
we can gather ourselves and subsequently put forth the desired
public face.108
This ability to withdraw from public gaze helps ensure a “zone . . .
that permits (degrees of) unconstrained, unobserved physical and
intellectual movement . . . [a] zone [that] furnishes room for a criti-
cal, playful subjectivity to develop.”109 This is the intellectual and
emotional space for us to choose which activities or thoughts we
wish to share or account for, and which we prefer to keep private,
whatever the reason. There is an intimate connection between this
space for reflectivity and self-development, which can be hampered
in the face of intense social pressure. As Bloustein argues,
The man who is compelled to live every minute of his life among
others and whose every need, thought, desire, fancy or gratifica-
tion is subject to public scrutiny, has been deprived of his indi-
viduality and human dignity. Such an individual merges with
the mass. His opinions, being public, tend never to be different;
his aspirations, being known, tend always to be conventionally
accepted ones; his feelings, being openly exhibited, tend to lose
103. Id. at 163.
104. HUW BEVERLY-SMITH ET AL., PRIVACY, PROPERTY AND PERSONALITY: CIVIL LAW
PERSPECTIVES ON COMMERCIAL APPROPRIATION 58 (2005).
105. FAIRFIELD, supra note 96, at 18.
106. Ferdinand Schoeman, Privacy and Intimate Information, in PHILOSOPHICAL
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 404 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984).
107. Id.
108. Lisa Austin, Privacy and the Question of Technology, 22 L. & PHIL. 119, 146–47
(2003). Austin also notes the limits to this approach, arguing elsewhere that “[i]t is one
thing to argue that we need some respite from the public gaze in order to forge an
authentic self, and quite another to assert that the particular gaze of a particular other
in fact interferes with this project of authenticity.” Austin, supra note 6, at 202.
109. Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 181, 195 (2008).
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their quality of unique personal warmth and to become the
feelings of every man. Such a being, although sentient, is fungi-
ble; he is not an individual.110
The ability to withdraw into a zone of privacy therefore helps us
to ‘be who we want to be,’ allowing us room to consider our options
before we act—the freedom and space to ‘grow into’ ourselves. Moore,
for example, argues that privacy is a “cultural universal necessary
for [our] proper functioning.”111 For Reiman, it “is a social ritual by
means of which an individual’s moral title to his existence is con-
ferred[,]” and by this I take him to mean that privacy helps individuals
understand that some aspects of the self are theirs and theirs alone,
and this understanding is key to an individual seeing themselves as,
in fact, an ‘individual.’112 He goes on to argue that individuals “must
also recognize that [they have] exclusive moral right[s] to shape
[their] destiny,” and privacy violations therefore are those that
“penetrate ‘the private reserve of the individual’ ” and destroy the
Self.113 Wasserstrom concurs, suggesting that one plausible concep-
tion of what it is to be a person is “the idea of the existence of a core
of thoughts and feelings that are [a] person’s alone[,]” and so enforced
disclosure of these thoughts and feelings diminishes personhood;
privacy protects against such disclosure.114
Clearly then, there is a deep similarity—normatively speaking—
in the values of autonomy and privacy within the liberal tradition:
both appear aimed at ensuring some level of independence and self-
development. But there is also a deep conceptual parallel in terms
of how those values are to be achieved. Lyon, for instance, notes that
“liberal approach [to privacy] . . . tends to conflate privacy [with]
resisting intrusion[;]”115 this also describes the conventional liberal
approach to autonomy. For Bennett, “[p]hilosophically, privacy has
its roots in liberal individualism, and notions of separation between
the state and civil society.”116 Thus, much as a conception of autonomy
as independence tends to lead to a focus on shielding the individual
110. Bloustein, supra note 4, at 188.
111. Adam D. Moore, Toward Informational Privacy Rights, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809,
817 (2007).
112. Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMEN-
SIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 310 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984).
113. Id. at 310, 311 (quoting ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 29 (1961)).
114. Richard A. Wasserstrom, Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions, in PHILO-
SOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 322 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed.,
1984).
115. DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE OF SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 186 (1994).
116. Colin J. Bennett, In Defence of Privacy: The Concept and the Regime, 8 SUR-
VEILLANCE & SOC’Y 485, 486 (2011).
450 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW           [  V    o l. 23:433
from external restraint through a wall of rights, liberal accounts of
privacy have also been based primarily on the idea of a legal barrier
protecting the individual from improper interference or access. As
Stadler describes it, privacy viewed in this fashion resembles “a
kind of bubble that surrounds each person, and the dimensions of
this bubble are determined by one’s ability to control who enters it
and who doesn’t. Privacy is a personal space; space under the exclu-
sive control of the individual.”117 Nedelsky also sees privacy as being
“closely associated with [a] boundary image[ ].”118 As I have argued,
this is also the approach that dominates the courtroom.
Now, it is true that conceptions of privacy reliant upon this
boundary idea and its associated public/private dichotomy have faced
numerous critiques, to the point where Bennett concludes that the
individualistic approach associated with a dichotomous public/private
barrier no longer “constitute[s] a paradigmatic understanding of the
problem.”119 Solove, for instance, argues that “[p]rivacy . . . is . . .
more complicated” than a division between public and private, and
“[m]odern technology poses a severe challenge to [this] traditional
binary understanding of privacy.”120 Gilliom meanwhile suggests
that because of privacy’s “roots in . . . individualism, [it] may no
longer reflect the complexity and interdependence of our world.”121
Stalder has also rejected the boundary approach as something that
just “doesn’t work.”122 Nissenbaum’s description of privacy as “con-
textual integrity” also rejects a strict public/private dichotomy on
the grounds that it is unable to sufficiently account for many of the
privacy losses that may be caused by the increasing digitization of
all areas of life, but particularly those that occur “in public.”123 She
observes that as individuals go about their lives, they are constantly
shifting between differing “realms” that “involve[ ], indeed may even
be defined by, a distinct set of norms, which govern[] its various
aspects such as roles, expectations, actions, and practices.”124 The
flow of information between these realms is typically governed by
117. Felix Stalder, Privacy is Not the Antidote to Surveillance, 1 SURVEILLANCE &
SOC’Y 120, 121 (2002).
118. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS 108 (2011).
119. Bennett, supra note 116, at 487.
120. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON
THE INTERNET 161, 163 (2007).
121. John Gilliom, Struggling with Surveillance: Resistance, Consciousness, and
Identity, in THE NEW POLITICS OF SURVEILLANCE AND VISIBILITY 123 (Richard V. Ericson
& Kevin D. Haggerty eds., 2006).
122. Stalder, supra note 117, at 121.
123. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 119–
20 (2004).
124. Id. at 137.
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“norms of appropriateness” and “norms of distribution.”125 What
matters is not “whether [the] information is appropriate or inappro-
priate for a given context, but whether its distribution, or flow,
respects contextual norms of information flow.”126 When either norm
is breached, we ought to see it as a violation of contextual integrity,
and thus, privacy.127 Under this approach, even ‘public’ matters
might generate a privacy claim if they inappropriately breach the
‘norms of distribution’ or ‘norms of appropriateness.’128
Austin also argues that an account of privacy based upon the
ability to present oneself to others need not depend on determining
different spheres of public and private life.129 She suggests that our
interest in privacy is not only a claim to be protected from social
pressure that results from a particular self-presentation, but rather
is about “protecting the conditions for self-presentation.”130 This self-
presentation, she says, is an act of “social communication,” and
practices that disrupt this communication by denying us the knowl-
edge of who our audience actually is can be understood as a privacy
violation (such as surveillance).131 However, she also argues that
violations of ‘privacy as identity’ in this fashion will “occur only
when the dissemination of private information also undermines
one’s capacity for self-presentation.”132 Such capacity is undermined,
according to Austin, when we are forced to incorporate into our self-
presentation this previously private information; “[t]he salient dis-
tinction is not between public and private spheres of life, but rather
between the types of audiences . . . .” to whom we were presenting.133
This helps explain the value of having certain privacy interests that
remain in public, since “changing the identity of one’s audience
through surreptitious surveillance or unexpected publication”134
harms our ability to properly gauge our exposure to those around
us, or those unseen.
Altman also focuses on the ability of the individual to regulate
his or her exposure.135 His proposition is that “privacy is . . . an
interpersonal boundary process by which a person . . . regulates
125. Id. at 119, 138.
126. Id. at 141 (emphasis in original).
127. Id. at 138.
128. Id. at 138–39.
129. Austin, supra note 6, at 207.
130. Id. at 210.
131. Id. at 204.
132. Id. at 205.
133. Id. at 205–06.
134. Id. at 204.
135. IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 6, 8 (1975).
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interaction with others.”136 Like Schwartz, then, Altman sees pri-
vacy as something that allows a negotiated level of exposure by an
individual to the community.137 Rather than being dependent upon
a fixed public/private boundary, then, Altman sees privacy as “a
dynamic process involving selective control over a self-boundary.”138
As noted, under the conventional liberal account, privacy is effec-
tively binary—once you have allowed intrusion into your personal
zone, or allowed access to yourself, or relinquished control over your
information, then typically claims to privacy based on such concep-
tions necessarily fail—you no longer have a ‘reasonable expectation
of privacy.’139 Altman rejects this, arguing that privacy “involves a
synthesis of being in contact with others and being out of contact
with others. [Because the] desire for social interaction or nonin-
teraction changes over time and with different circumstances.”140
Importantly then, this view of privacy is not only about regulating
the flow of information, but also about regulating relationships; it
is a “dialectic process, which involves both a restriction of interac-
tion and a seeking of interaction.”141 As Steeves argues in her con-
sideration of Altman’s work, “privacy is the boundary between [the]
self and [the] other that is negotiated through discursive interaction
between two or more social actors.”142
Again, this is a useful way of understanding how privacy inter-
ests can continue to exist in public space. It accepts that by entering
into a public area individuals seek (or at least accept) some level of
interaction with those around them and therefore have no claim to
visual privacy vis-à-vis those immediately present. But it would not,
however, automatically deny that any privacy interest can exist once
an individual is acting in the public realm—thus, being continually
‘stalked’ or having one’s public movements recorded and archived
could still ground a privacy claim, because such actions deny to a
putative plaintiff the right to negotiate the boundary between her-
self and those around her. Likewise, unwanted commercial public
136. Id. at 6 (emphasis omitted). Altman was writing in the context of human be-
havioral studies on the impact of crowding and notions of personal space, but his ideas
have been adopted into the privacy discourse. See, e.g., Valerie Steeves, Reclaiming the
Social Value of Privacy, in LESSONS FROM THE IDENTITY TRAIL: ANONYMITY, PRIVACY AND
IDENTITY IN A NETWORKED SOCIETY 203 (2009); Leysia Palen & Paul Dourish, Unpacking
“Privacy” for a Networked World, 5 PRO. OF THE CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUTING
SYS. 129, 129 (2003).
137. See ALTMAN, supra note 135, at 18.
138. Id. at 6.
139. See supra notes 5–35 and accompanying text.
140. See ALTMAN, supra note 135, at 23.
141. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
142. Steeves, supra note 136, at 206.
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photography might be interpreted as a privacy loss because the ability
of the individual to control his or her exposure to an audience removed
temporally and spatially is significantly interfered with. As Altman
argues, “it is not the inclusion or exclusion . . . that is vital to self-
definition; it is the ability to regulate contact when desired.”143 It is
“[w]hen the permeability of those boundaries is under the control of
a person” that both self-development and autonomy are served.144
But transforming these ideas into statements about when a privacy
claim ought to be granted by the law still requires, of course, a solid
normative foundation. That is, identifying a privacy loss in public
cannot alone be the basis for generating a valid legal claim; again,
‘containment anxiety’ is a legitimate concern.145 My complaint is
simply that the existing solution to that anxiety is inadequate. Recall
that Nissenbaum’s ‘contextual integrity’ approach, for instance, relies
on existing norms of appropriateness and distribution to determine
when privacy has been breached.146 A legal regime based on this
idea would see actionable breaches of privacy as violations of partic-
ular norms. But this means that the framework underpinning it
would be dependent upon the presence of particular norms already
being in effect that support the desired goals; being tied to practice
and convention, this kind of legal regime may not alone have suffi-
cient “prescriptive value or moral authority” to properly grapple with
a range of modern privacy claims.147 The (legal) death of privacy by
a thousand cuts, in other words. On the other hand, there is also the
opposite risk that a regime grounded in contextual integrity might
be overly conservative if it saw privacy violations in any new techno-
logical means of managing personal information, simply because it
was new (and therefore a break in an existing norm of distribution).148
Similar problems plague Schwartz’s reliance on largely unstated
‘norms’ as the basis of his constitutive approach—he argues for lines
between public and private to be drawn and redrawn along different
coordinates in order to reflect different “information[al] privacy
norms.”149 Again, without knowing the precise content of these norms,
it is difficult to know if Schwartz’s conception will leave us with a
relatively robust or relatively weak defense of a range of modern pri-
vacy interests. Schwartz seems to argue for a general framework tied
to the interests of the democratic community—public accountability
requires access to personal information, and bureaucratic rationality
143. ALTMAN, supra note 135, at 50.
144. Id.
145. Austin, supra note 6, at 170.
146. Niessenbaum, supra note 123, at 138.
147. Id. at 144.
148. Id. at 143–44.
149. Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 834 (1999).
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needs it in order to allow administrative structures to function.150
But this still fails to explain when specific privacy claims ought to
be recognized by a legal system, though logically his position implies
that it would be justified where it would prevent harm to (or work to
protect) general democratic interests. Such an approach, though, has
limited relevance when it comes to adjudicating privacy claims that
are not a question of the relationship between the citizen and the
state.
In sum, while the focus on shifting points of access and the need
to create an interface between public and private aspects of life in
the above approaches is a welcome departure from the conventional
boundary or zonal approaches to privacy, more is needed. Without
further normative underpinning they cannot tell us which privacy
losses ought to ground legal actions and which should not. It is to
that idea I now turn.
III. THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF AUTONOMY:
THE RELATIONAL ACCOUNT
While the academe may have in large part rejected the dichoto-
mous approach to privacy, these insights do not appear to have been
meaningfully embraced by the courts. As I have suggested, this
proves problematic for claims to privacy where at issue is informa-
tion or activities that in one way or another straddle the barrier
between private and public or shift between them. We see that
where individuals have chosen not to ‘withdraw’ into an a priori
understood zone of privacy or have voluntarily shared some kind of
personal information with even one other person, they are typically
deemed by the courts to have given up any ‘reasonable expectation’
of an ongoing privacy interest.151 I have suggested that this ap-
proach is due to a deep conceptual linkage between privacy and con-
ventional accounts of autonomy; if our understanding of autonomy
can be improved, this might also tell us something valuable about
our approach to privacy.
The individualistic account of autonomy sketched earlier in this
Article has come under sustained criticism from a range of scholars,
including communitarians who reject the liberal conception of auton-
omy entirely.152 But even liberal scholars have acknowledged the
150. Id. at 828.
151. Nissenbaum, supra note 123, at 135–36.
152. See, e.g., AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES,
AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA 253 (1993); ELIZABETH FRAZER & NICOLA LACEY, THE
POLITICS OF COMMUNITY: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE LIBERAL-COMMUNITARIAN DEBATE
102 (1993); DANIEL BELL, COMMUNITARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS 4 (1993); Chandran
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deep weakness in the individualistic account. Raz, for instance,
recognizes that “[a]n autonomous personality can only develop and
flourish against a background of biological and social constraints,”153
and that “[t]he completely autonomous person is an impossibility.”154
Dworkin too admits “substantive independence . . . [would] make[]
autonomy inconsistent with loyalty . . . commitment, benevolence,
and love[,]” all of which are important values.155 Crittenden also ad-
vocates for liberals to “jettison from their theories any remnants of
atomistic individualism,” though cautions them to “resist the associ-
ation of autonomy with communal boundaries” that he sees as the
defining element of the communitarian approaches to which he does
not subscribe.156 Criticisms of the traditional liberal account are also
widespread in feminist legal scholarship, which critiques it as being
posited as a ‘universal’ value in theory but in practice one that is
highly gendered. Benhabib, for instance, suggests that the “[liberal]
tradition, when it considers the autonomous individual . . . implic-
itly defines [it] as the standpoint of [men].”157 Griffiths also argues
that liberal ideas of autonomy are based upon the “unencumbered
[man]. . . free of ties,” whereas women “assert . . . value . . . [in a]
social life which is rooted in ties to their family, friends, neighbour-
hood, culture and family history.”158 Friedman goes further, arguing
that autonomy is “antithetical to women’s interests because it
prompts men to desert the social relationships on which many
women depend for . . . [their] well-being . . . [and that of] their chil-
dren.”159 Barclay concludes that the typical liberal conception of
autonomy is “starkly at odds with many women’s experience[s].”160
Likewise, Code believes that a focus on autonomy that places the
importance of free action above all else privileges the interest of men,
who are not expected to undertake the same social roles as women.161
Kukathas, Liberalism, Communitarianism, and Political Community, in THE COMMUNI-
TARIAN CHALLENGE TO LIBERALISM 80–81 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1996).
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157. Seyla Benhabib, Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition,
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It is true that some of these feminist critiques seek to abandon
autonomy as a value entirely and would fall into the communitarian
camp. However, in my view, though there is much truth behind the
practical realities of these critiques, on a conceptual level there is
nothing about approaching autonomy in a manner that is not
starkly individualistic or applied on a gendered basis that is inher-
ently “anti-liberal” or that demands the wholesale rejection of liberal-
ism’s key tenets. Feminist legal theory is a broad church, however,
and within it can be found a useful theory that seeks to maintain
the ideal of autonomy “without buying into the negatives of liberal
legalism.”162 The idea I wish to consider here—relational auton-
omy—is perhaps best associated with the scholarship of Nedelsky.163
She seeks not to abandon the value of autonomy entirely, but rather
to improve our understanding of the ways in which it can be nur-
tured and protected.164 So, while agreeing with the general thrust of
the feminist critique of autonomy, her account remains within the
liberal tradition broadly: “Relational views . . . underscore the social
embeddedness of selves while not forsaking the basic value commit-
ments of . . . liberal[] justice. [They] underscore the social components
of our self-concepts as well as emphasize the role that background
social dynamics and power structures play in the enjoyment and
development of autonomy.”165
Nedelsky accepts, for instance, that “[t]o become autonomous is
to come to be able to find and live in accordance with one’s own
law.”166 What she disputes, however, is that it is solely freedom from
external influence that enables that autonomy.167 Her relational
account therefore does not seek to redefine what autonomy is so
much as redefine how it can be achieved, and is consequently fo-
cused on whether individuals in fact have the substantive capacities
for that autonomy.168 The central proposition is that the substantive
capacity for autonomous decision-making (self-governance) can only
come when one is embedded in the right kinds of social environ-
ments.169 In Friedman’s words, “persons are fundamentally social
PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF 184–85 (Catriona Mackenzie
& Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000).
162. Susan G. Kupfer, Autonomy and Community in Feminist Legal Thought, 22
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 583, 595 (1992).
163. See Nedelsky, supra note 99, at 8; NEDELSKY, supra note 118, at 3.
164. Nedelsky, supra note 99, at 10.
165. John Christman, Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism, and the Social
Constitution of Selves, 117 PHIL. STUDIES 143, 143 (2004).
166. NEDELSKY, supra note 118, at 123.
167. Id. at 60, 61.
168. Nedelsky, supra note 99, at 25.
169. Id. at 36.
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beings who develop the competency for autonomy through social
interaction with other persons.”170 Joseph Kupfer, likewise, would
argue that while the stranded sailor on an island is ‘perfectly autono-
mous’ under an individualist account, lacking any external restric-
tions other than the natural world, this misses the point: “[w]ithout
the opportunity to be with others, autonomy is empty.”171 The tradi-
tional liberal-individualistic account says Nedelsky, “misses the
reality that the capacity for autonomy can only develop and thrive
when fostered by constructive relationships, such as those with
parents, teachers, friends, and agents of the state.”172 Thus, she ar-
gues, eliminating external restraints is no guarantee of autonomy,
since one requires relationships that “provide the support and
guidance necessary” for its development.173 Under the relational
accounts, the capacity of the individual for autonomous decision-
making is not automatically threatened by the relationships it has
with ‘the collective’; quite to the contrary, those relationships may
at times be vital for that autonomy.174
For Nedelsky, the very idea of exercising autonomy as an iso-
lated figure is therefore a misnomer, as “the ‘content’ of one’s own
law is comprehensible only with reference to shared social norms,
values, and concepts.”175 Autonomy, she says, “can thrive or wither
in adults depending on the structures of relationship they are em-
bedded in.”176 Thus, per Stoljar and Mackenzie, the most autonomous
individuals are not in fact those who are most isolated; instead,
autonomy is also a characteristic of “agents [who are] emotional,
emodied, desiring, creative, and feeling.”177 Nedelsky likewise seeks
to replace an understanding of autonomy that focuses on exclusion
and the dichotomy between the individual and the collective with
one based on the metaphor of ‘childrearing.’178 That is, children do
not achieve autonomy through the increased shedding of familial
bonds, but rather grow into autonomous adults as a result of being
raised in an appropriate manner by a loving family or community in
which bonds and relationships remain an important vehicle through
170. Friedman, supra note 98, at 41.
171. JOSEPH H. KUPFER, AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 159 (1990).
172. NEDELSKY, supra 118, at 167.
173. Nedelsky, supra note 99, at 12.
174. Id. at 36.
175. Id. at 11.
176. NEDELSKY, supra note 118, at 39.
177. Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, Introduction: Autonomy Reconfigured, in
RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL
SELF 21 (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000).
178. Nedelsky, supra note 99, at 12.
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which autonomy can be expressed.179 As Modell explains, “[t]he
child’s creative use of solitude requires the presence of the mother
in order to affirm the continuity of the self. . . . The private self . . .
frees one from dependency, yet requires the other for its continued
existence.”180 Thus, advocating a relational approach to autonomy
does not deny that the ‘Self’ is an important construct, but rather
argues that it is meaningless without reference to social context,
and thus one cannot legitimately protect the ‘autonomous Self’
simply through the elimination of external influences.181 As Tice and
Baumeister argue, “[r]elating to others is part of what the self is for.
The self is constructed, used, altered, and maintained as a way of
connecting the individual [to others].”182 Kupfer concludes, then,
that “[a]utonomy derives its meaning from a social context in that
we exercise [it] in relation to others, as social beings.”183
The core tenet of relational accounts is therefore that autonomy
can only be properly achieved “under socially supportive conditions.”184
Developing the capacity for autonomy or ensuring its continued
exercise requires not simply guarding against certain kinds of overt
coercive external restrictions upon individuals, but also the protec-
tion of social contexts that assist in our capacity for autonomous
thinking and action.185 The “autonomy-undermining injustices” to
which individuals are constantly vulnerable are not only the kinds
of external interferences against which the individualist conception
of autonomy might guard, but also disruptions to social relation-
ships generally.186 The importance of the social context also means
that autonomy is something that can be gained and lost—as one’s
social context shifts, so too might one’s capacities to engage in autono-
mous decision-making and action. This means that the proper social
context must continually be nourished, as “people’s . . . capacities for
autonomy will vary enormously both across individuals and within
a given person across time and across different spheres of . . . life.”187
Of course, much as there are competing accounts of ‘liberal’ auton-
omy, so too is the case here; “ ‘relational autonomy’ . . . does not refer
179. Id.
180. ARNOLD H. MODELL, THE PRIVATE SELF 78 (1993).
181. See id. at 42.
182. Dianne M. Tice & Roy F. Baumeister, The Primacy of the Interpersonal Self, in
INDIVIDUAL SELF, RELATIONAL SELF, COLLECTIVE SELF 71 (Constantine Sedikides &
Marilynn B. Brewer eds., 2001) (emphasis in original).
183. KUPFER, supra note 171, at 159–60.
184. Anderson & Honneth, supra note 66, at 130.
185. NEDELSKY, supra note 118, at 54–55.
186. Anderson & Honneth, supra note 66, at 130.
187. NEDELSKY, supra note 118, at 173.
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to a single unified conception of autonomy but is rather an umbrella
term, designating a range of related perspectives[,]” all of which share
the idea that the social context in which an individual is embedded
has a dramatic impact upon the chances of a full realization of
autonomy.188 Accounts under this umbrella differ, for instance, as to
whether or not a theory of relational autonomy ought to “treat
relationality as conceptually . . . necessary to autonomy” rather than
just causally necessary.189 In other words, are “agents . . . intrinsi-
cally relational because their identities . . . are constituted by ele-
ments of the social context in which they are embedded” or are
“agents . . . causally relational because their natures are produced
by certain historical and social conditions[?]”190 To say that rela-
tionality is conceptually or constitutively necessary would mean that
an individual would need to be embedded in specific relationships
to be considered autonomous; on that account, social conditions are
more than background conditions, and autonomy “cannot be spelled
out without direct reference to a person’s social environment.”191
In my view, though intuitively appealing, this ‘conceptually
necessary’ approach to relationality brings risks. From the perspec-
tive of the individual, any given community, after all, is inherently
Janus-faced; it can be both a hindrance and a help to the cause of
autonomy. We must be cautious about reifying particular kinds of
social relations at the expense of the ability of the individual to ex-
tricate themselves from damaging social contexts within which they
may find themselves—including those that in other contexts or for
other individuals may be critically supportive of autonomy, such as
family or intimate partners. As Mackenzie argues, while relationships
are vital for autonomy, “social relationships that . . . do not recog-
nize their moral equality” can hamper it.192 Mackenzie notes that
capacities for autonomy are “vulnerable to[ ] our relationships with
others in all the different spheres of our lives.”193 Her argument is
188. Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 177, at 4.
189. Andrea C. Westlund, Rethinking Relational Autonomy, 24 HYPATIA 26, 27 (2009);
see also Marina Oshana, Autonomy and the Question of Authenticity, 33 SOC. THEORY &
PRAC. 411, 411 (2007); Marina Oshana, Personal Autonomy and Society, 29 J. SOC. PHIL.
81, 81 (1998). Oshana’s ‘constructive account’ is in opposition to John Christman’s ‘causal
account.’ See Christman, supra note 165, at 150–51; JOHN CHRISTMAN, THE POLITICS OF
PERSONS : INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND SOCIO-HISTORICAL SELVES 166–67 (2009). Catriona
Mackenzie attempts to split the difference between the two approaches. See Catriona
Mackenzie, Relational Autonomy, Normative Authority and Perfectionism, 39 J. SOC.
PHIL. 512, 512 (2008).
190. Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 177, at 22.
191. Holger Baumann, Reconsidering Relational Autonomy—Personal Autonomy for So-
cially Embedded and Temporally Extended Selves, 30 ANALYSE & KRITIK 445, 448 (2008).
192. Mackenzie, supra note 189, at 526.
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that the “social character of autonomy” does not demand paternalis-
tic interference to assure that individuals are autonomous, but
rather “highlights the positive obligations of social institutions to
promote the autonomy of citizens by fostering the social conditions
for autonomy.”194 Nedelsky too accepts that a relational interpreta-
tion of autonomy “do[es] not mean . . . that people are determined
by their relationships,” or that “all relationships are good,” and that
autonomy must allow people “to extricate themselves from bad
relationships.”195 But, though there is no single account of relational
autonomy, what is important is the “shared conviction . . . that
persons are socially embedded and that . . . [their] identities are
formed within the context of social relationships . . . .”196
I seek to draw from this relational approach to autonomy, then,
the contention that generating and protecting capacities for the
development and exercise of autonomy requires not merely the pro-
gressive elimination of external influence, but rather the generation
and protection of a positive social context in which the individual is
embedded. The argument is that a supportive social context is for
most people necessary for the achievement and maintenance of auton-
omy, understood as self-governance. While this approach rejects the
individualist claim that the elimination of external influences
necessarily generates or protects the conditions of autonomy, it none-
theless remains alive to traditional liberal concerns regarding the
harm that may befall individuals subject to an overbearing commu-
nity. As I have suggested, there is an important philosophical linkage
between approaches to autonomy and privacy. Thus, by drawing
from a reconstructed account of autonomy that still remains within
the liberal tradition, I intend to likewise offer a reconstructed ac-
count of privacy that still has value in a legal system built on liberal
ideals. In the next section then, I suggest that the idea of relational
autonomy as sketched above can underpin a different approach to
privacy that is not dependent upon spatial questions or barrier
metaphors and thus, in turn, can better ground a legal approach to
privacy in tort that is responsive to a range of modern privacy
claims whilst not succumbing to ‘containment anxiety.’
IV. RELATIONAL PRIVACY
I am not the first to describe an idea of ‘relational privacy,’
though the conception I advocate for here differs somewhat from
194. Id. at 530.
195. NEDELSKY, supra note 118, at 31, 32.
196. Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 177, at 4.
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those that came before. Cohen, for instance, has described ‘rela-
tional privacy’ as “the right not to have one’s constitutive identity
needs violated or interfered with by the state or by third parties
without very compelling reasons indeed.”197 She was writing this
within the context of the American jurisprudence surrounding the
abortion debate, and was therefore primarily concerned with pro-
tecting a woman’s zone of “decisional autonomy, inviolability of
personality, and a sense of control over one’s identity needs.”198 Thus,
while she uses the term ‘relational privacy,’ Cohen still appears to
rely upon a conception of autonomy reliant primarily upon the bound-
ary metaphor, seeking to prevent interference in a woman’s right to
make decisions about her body. Grounded in United States abortion
rights debates, this is understandable—feminist theorists have
argued that claims to privacy have long been used to subject women
to domestic violence by creating a zone into which the state histori-
cally was reluctant to tread, whilst simultaneously advancing a belief
that privacy (better understood perhaps as ‘decisional privacy’) is
vital to the constitutional protection of abortion rights.199 Cohen is
not, then, arguing that relational privacy is necessary to protect par-
ticular social contexts that help create autonomy, but is instead argu-
ing that relational privacy creates a zone of decisional autonomy.
The idea that privacy can protect relationships is also not new,
though in my view relational privacy is not the same thing. Rachels,
for instance, argues that privacy is important because it allows for
a diversity of relationships.200 On his account, there is a close con-
nection between our ability to control who has access to us and our
ability to both create and maintain a variety of relationships.201 The
ability to maintain an array of relationships on different levels with
different kinds of people is, he says, “one of the most important
reasons why we value privacy.” 202 Schoeman also believes that in
addition to protecting aspects of the self, privacy also “marks out
something morally significant . . . about what it is to have a close
relationship with another [person].” 203 He suggests that entrusting
197. Jean L. Cohen, Rethinking Privacy: The Abortion Controversy, in PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE IN THOUGHT AND PRACTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON A GRAND DICHOTOMY 133, 153
(Jeff Weintraub & Krishan Kumar eds., 1997) (emphasis omitted).
198. Id. at 138.
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another individual with intimate information about ourselves is a
means of conveying to that individual that the information is impor-
tant to us.204 By respecting the decision regarding with whom to
share these intimacies, we enrich “social and personal interaction
by providing contexts for the development of varied kinds of rela-
tionships and multiple dimensions of personality.” 205 Reiman, on the
other hand, critiques this vision of privacy, suggesting that it im-
properly creates a market conception of intimacy by positing that
levels of intimacy are determined by what we choose to withhold
from others.206 There must be more, says Reiman, to intimate rela-
tionships than simply swapping information.207 I concur: intimate
(and non-intimate) relationships are surely about more than simply
choosing or declining to swap information, though at the same time
it is possible to imagine that such relationships might be furthered
or retarded by decisions related to the exclusive sharing of certain
kinds of information between partners.
The relational account I advocate here is not about creating a
‘zone’ in which the individual is protected from intrusion in order
that they can develop certain kinds of relationships—in effect, that
would still be a ‘boundary dependant’ approach. Instead, a proper
relational account attempts to gauge the severity of any claimed
privacy violation by analyzing the harm it does to the web of rela-
tionships any individual finds herself in. Nedelsky has argued that
in the context of informational privacy what matters is the “direct
exploration of the relational dimension of how the circulation of in-
formation matters to people.” 208 While she does not explore this idea
in detail, the suggestion appears to be that it is not enough to pro-
tect privacy simply by shielding the individual from overt external
influence or by granting them control over certain kinds of informa-
tion in certain scenarios. Instead protection of privacy can only be
achieved by limiting the adverse impacts of circulation of informa-
tion, regardless of whether it is ‘sensitive’ or ‘personal’ or whether
control over it has been relinquished at some point. I agree, and sug-
gest it meshes well with a paradigm that treats privacy as an ongoing,
negotiable relationship between the Self and the Other (whether
that is between two individuals, or the individual and the commu-
nity, or between groups and the community). Much as relational au-
tonomy abandons the idea of a shield from all external influence as
the defining characteristic of the achievement of personal autonomy,
204. See id. at 406.
205. Id. at 413.
206. Reiman, supra note 112, at 305.
207. See id.
208. NEDELSKY, supra note 118, at 109.
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an account of relational privacy abandons the boundary metaphor.
Rather than treating privacy as a protective bubble that is always
in danger of being ‘popped’ by an external invasion, this new rela-
tional account understands it instead as a field or blanket. The
ability to wrap oneself in a ‘privacy blanket’ implies several things.
First, that privacy can be shared—the blanket can be drawn around
not only yourself, but also those close to you. Second, that privacy can
be taken with you—the blanket is something you can choose to wear
at all times, wherever you go. Third, that privacy can be weakened
and strengthened over time by different practices—the blanket can
become frayed, but can be repaired. Thus, relational privacy accepts
not only that privacy has, at times, a role to play both in creating a
personal zone of freedom from unwanted outside interference, but
also that it can be used as a means of protecting one’s interactions
within a broader community, helping to ensure that the necessary
capacities for personal growth and autonomy are properly nourished
over time. Privacy is therefore a technique by which one can modu-
late one’s engagement and role within a broader community, and so
choosing to engage with others around you does not imply that
privacy has been totally abandoned.
As I have argued, when translated into legal claims, boundary
conceptions of privacy tend to have a difficult time accounting for
those modern privacy issues that relate in some way to a sense of
maintaining aspect of privacy in public or over information that has
been shared with some but over which the holder wishes to main-
tain a privacy interest. This is because they are dependent on courts
establishing where the a priori boundary is—there must be some
limit to privacy claims, and so the limitation mechanism tends to be
a spatial divide between areas that are public and areas that are
private or over information associated with that zone. In contrast,
a legal regime grounded in a relational approach to privacy could
conceivably allow for privacy claims to arise in public space. A privacy
loss would be understood as an unwanted reduction in the ability of
an individual to negotiate their ‘distance’ between themselves and
other social actors (which we can also describe as ‘exposure’). In turn,
a legally actionable privacy loss would be one that it is so significant
that it harms an individual’s capacity for autonomy, understood from
the relational perspective. This concept still allows for a right to
privacy in public that is bounded, rather than being unlimited, and
so ought to remain responsive to the traditional concerns about con-
tainment. An unlimited right to privacy in public, of course, would
be implausible—the moment we step outside, we freely share our lo-
cation, appearance, and behaviours to all those around us. Nothing
in this Article argues that the everyday existence of participating in
464 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW           [  V    o l. 23:433
public life ought to ground a legal claim against simply being
‘watched’ by those also present. But, ‘relational privacy’ argues that
the fact that an individual may have been acting ‘in public,’ in full
view of others—the spatial question—ought not to be the only rele-
vant factor in determining whether there is a valid claim. Instead,
the question ought to be looked at from the relational perspective.
In other words, did the alleged privacy loss ultimately threaten to
harm their autonomy, understood relationally? Did the privacy loss
ultimately risk damage to the capacities that allow the individual
to act in accordance with their “own choices, values, and identity” in
building their role within the community?209
V. RELATIONAL PRIVACY IN PRACTICE:
BREACH OF CONFIDENCE ACTIONS
What would such an approach look like in the context of tort
law, then? Rather than adopting a dichotomous approach to the
public/private question as a means of determining the validity of the
claim, the approach I advocate would focus upon the particular harms
suffered by individuals subjected to a privacy loss, and, in particu-
lar, considers how their role in the community may be impacted. In
my view, the seeds of a relational privacy account can in fact be
found in the way in which some jurisdictions are using an expanded
breach of confidence action to protect certain kinds of privacy inter-
ests, rather than a standalone privacy tort. Historically, a successful
breach of confidence action has required proof of three elements:
“First, the information itself . . . must ‘have the necessary quality of
confidence about it.’ Secondly, that information must have been
imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence.
Thirdly, there must be an unauthorised use of that information to
the detriment of the party communicating it.” 210
Typically, such an action was used in a commercial context in
order to prevent the release of confidential information.211 Courts in
some common law jurisdictions have in recent years loosened the
requirements of the action in order to allow it to incorporate claims
of privacy between parties with no prior relationship, let alone a
commercial one that would justify the historical interpretation of
circumstances importing an obligation of confidence. The first notable
use was in Australian Broadcasting Company v. Lenah Game Meats,
209. Friedman, supra note 98, at 37.
210. Coco v. A. N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd., [1969] 2 Ch 41 at 47 (Eng.) (quoting Saltman
v. Eng’g Co. v. Campbell Eng’g Co. [1948] 65 Ch 203, 215).
211. See id. at 48.
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in which the Australian High Court had to consider an application
for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the broadcast of a clan-
destinely made film of an animal processing facility.212 One of the
arguments (and the only one I will focus on here) adopted by the
defendant/appellant meat processor was that a corporation had a
right to privacy, and that broadcast by ABC would breach that
right.213 Gleeson C.J. argued that an action for breach of confidence
could be sustained to protect private information, even absent a
relationship between the parties that imported an obligation of
confidence over it, if the disclosure of the information was “highly
offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.” 214 In so
doing, he also indicated an acceptance that public and private are
not always mutually exclusive things:
There is no bright line which can be drawn between what is
private and what is not. Use of the term “public” is often a con-
venient method of contrast, but there is a large area in between
what is necessarily public and what is necessarily private. An
activity is not private simply because it is not done in public. It
does not suffice to make an act private that, because it occurs on
private property, it has such measure of protection from the
public gaze as the characteristics of the property, the nature of
the activity, the locality, and the disposition of the property
owner combine to afford. Certain kinds of information about a
person, such as information relating to health, personal relation-
ships, or finances, may be easy to identify as private; as may
certain kinds of activity, which a reasonable person, applying
contemporary standards of morals and behaviour, would under-
stand to be meant to be unobserved.215
A majority of the High Court felt it unnecessary to definitively
adopt a freestanding privacy tort on the facts before it in Lenah
Game Meats,216 instead expanding the breach of confidence action
beyond its traditional confines in order to recognize non-commercial
privacy interests.217 In so doing, they incorporated the “highly offen-
sive” test as a means of limiting the scope of the breach of confidence
action in the same manner of standalone privacy torts elsewhere.218
212. ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 199 (Austl.).
213. See id. at 225.
214. Id. at 226.
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Critically, however, and unlike in the American model, this question
was whether or not the impact of the disclosure rather than the
subject matter itself was offensive.219 This was important, because
it allowed for the effects of the privacy breach to help guide the tort,
rather than looking for the existence of an a priori determined
matter, revelation of which was necessarily “highly offensive.” 220
Indeed, this distinction became relevant in a subsequent lower court
case in which the plaintiff brought an action for, inter alia, invasion
of privacy after being stalked and harassed by the defendant.221
Skoien J. noted that since the High Court had not foreclosed the
development of a freestanding privacy tort in Lenah Game Meats he
was free to do so, describing it as “a bold . . . . [b]ut . . . logical and
desirable step” to take.222 In describing the tort, Skoien J. concluded
that an invasion of privacy would have to be a willed act that in-
vaded upon the seclusion or solitude of the plaintiff causing detri-
ment or distress, and the invasion would also have to be undertaken
“in a manner which would be considered highly offensive to a rea-
sonable person of ordinary sensibilities.” 223 Though adopting in a
general sense the first branch of the American privacy tort, Skoien
J. nonetheless followed the interpretation of “highly offensive” given
in Lenah Game Meats, again focusing on the nature and impact of
the breach rather than the subject matter.224 Thus an action for
invasion of privacy was sustained for activities (unwanted following,
etc.) that largely occurred in public places.225 Such a result would be
highly unlikely were similar facts to arise in the American context.
The English common law has long rejected the creation of a
standalone privacy tort, perhaps out of the “containment anxiety”
spoken of earlier.226 Even claims for what (from a layperson’s view)
seemed to be obvious breaches of privacy had floundered in the Eng-
lish courts. For instance, in Kaye v. Robertson, a reporter photo-
graphed a television actor (without his consent or knowledge) as he
lay recovering in a hospital room following injuries sustained to his
head.227 Indeed, much of the impetus in the English common law to
extend the tort of breach of confidence into a vehicle that can create
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See Grosse v Purvis [2003] QDC 151 para. 1 (Austl.).
222. Id. at ¶ 442.
223. Id. at ¶ 444.
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suitable remedies for privacy invasions appears to stem from the
tabloid press and its relentless pursuit of celebrities or other well-
known figures. In Kaye, the plaintiff brought suit to restrain publi-
cation of the photograph on the ground that it was an invasion of his
privacy.228 Commenting on the inadequacy of the English common
law in this situation, Bingham LJ commented:
If ever a person has a right to be let alone by strangers with no
public interest to pursue, it must surely be when he lies in hospi-
tal recovering from brain surgery and in no more than partial
command of his faculties. It is this invasion of his privacy which
underlies the plaintiff’s complaint. Yet it alone, however gross,
does not entitle him to relief in English law.229
As recently as 2003, the House of Lords concluded that no tort
of invasion of privacy existed in the English common law, and thus
ruled there was no remedy available to two plaintiffs who had un-
necessarily been strip-searched before being allowed to visit a relative
in prison.230 Instead, like their Australian counterparts, the English
courts have chosen to extend protections for certain kinds of privacy
breaches (at least those that would fall under the rubric of ‘publicity
given to private facts’), by expanding the action of breach of confi-
dence. This expansion was justified thanks to the enactment in 1998
of the Human Rights Act (HRA),231 which effectively incorporated
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)232 into domestic
English law.233 Since the ECHR explicitly protects an individual’s
“right to respect for . . . private and family life,”234 Butler argues that
its incorporation has led the English courts to expand the typical
requirements of a breach of confidence action in two key ways.235
First, an expansion to include not just commercial information but
personal information exchanged between individuals in a variety of
intimate relationships.236 Second, a “recognition that the obligation
228. See id. at 62.
229. Id. at 70.
230. See Wainwright v. Home Office [2003] 3 WLR 1137 [35], [52] (Eng.).
231. See Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42 (UK).
232. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights & Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. 5 [hereinafter European Convention].
233. Section 6 of the Human Rights Act reads “it is unlawful for a public authority
[including a court or tribunal] to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention
right.” Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42 § 6 (UK).
234. European Convention, supra note 232, at art. 8.
235. Des Butler, A Tort of Invasion of Privacy in Australia?, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 339,
346 (2005).
236. Id. See also Prince Albert v. Strange (1849) 41 Eng. Rep. 1171. 1171; 1 Mac & G
25 (UK) (in which a publisher had obtained copies of private etchings of members of the
royal family made in their home); Stephens v. Avery, [1988] Ch 449, 449 (UK).
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of confidence is not restricted to the original confidante, but may
also extend to third parties in whose hands the confidential infor-
mation may come to reside.” 237 This retooling of the breach of confi-
dence action has been the favoured approach by the English courts
to dealing with claims for privacy over personal information:
It is most unlikely that any purpose will be served by a judge
seeking to decide whether there exists a new cause of action in
tort which protects privacy. In the great majority of situations,
if not all situations, where the protection of privacy is justified,
relating to events after the Human Rights Act 1998 came into
force, an action for breach of confidence now will, where this is
appropriate, provide the necessary protection.238
The European Commission of Human Rights has also accepted
this, concluding in Earl Spencer v. United Kingdom that the appli-
cant had failed to demonstrate that “the remedy of breach of confi-
dence . . . was insufficient or ineffective” in being able to restrain
the publication of photographs and private information about his
marriage and his wife’s health.239 In other words, the UK could meet
its obligations under the ECHR to guarantee an individual’s “right
to respect for . . . private and family life” without adopting a free-
standing privacy tort.240 While a detailed discussion of the evolution
of the English common law in this area following implementation of
the HRA is beyond the scope of this Article,241 Campbell v. MGN242
is a crucial case that offers an important overview of this approach.
In Campbell, a well-known model brought suit for invasion of privacy
237. Butler, supra note 235.
238. A. v. B. plc [2002] EWCA (Civ) 337, [2003] QB 195 at 205–06 (Eng.).
239. Spencer v. United Kingdom, [1998] 25 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 105, at 20.
240. European Convention, supra note 232, at art. 8.
241. See, e.g., CTB v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2011] EWHC (QB) 1232 [1]
(involving an injunction that was granted preventing a newspaper from publishing the
details of claimant’s sexual relationship with a woman to whom he was not married);
Douglas v. Hello Ltd. [2005] EWCA (Civ) 595 [25] (Eng.) (awarding a celebrity couple
damages for having surreptitiously taken and published photographs of their wedding
despite the fact that they had agreed to publish different photos from their wedding); A
v. B plc [2002] EWCA (Civ) 337, [2003] QB 195 at 216 (Eng.); Theakston v. MGN [2002]
EWHC 137 [1] (Eng.) (granting an injunction to prevent publication of photographs re-
vealing a children’s television presenter engaged in sexual conduct in brothel); Venables
v. New Group Newspapers Ltd. [2001] Fam 430 [97], [104] (Eng.) (granting injunctions
regarding the disclosure of information that could lead to the identification of the killers
of a child after they reached the age of majority and were released from prison). See also
Basil Markesinis et al., Concerns and Ideas About the Developing English Law of Privacy
(And How Knowledge of Foreign Law Might Be of Help), 52 AM. J. COMPARATIVE L. 133,
134 (2004) (providing an excellent overview of the evolution of the law in this area).
242. Campbell v. MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 (Eng.).
2017] ‘RELATIONAL PRIVACY’ & TORT 469
after a tabloid newspaper published photographs of her leaving a
Narcotics Anonymous meeting.243 Had this case been brought under
the first or third branches of American framework, it is likely that
the newspaper would have won, not only on First Amendment
grounds but also simply because the photographs were taken of the
claimant on a public street. Ultimately, however, a majority of the
House of Lords found MGN liable, with the central dispute being
whether the newspaper had a duty of confidence with regard to the
information (the photographs and details of Campbell’s treatment),
and if so, whether the claimant’s right to privacy under Article 8 of
the ECHR was outweighed by the newspaper’s competing right to
free expression under Article 10.244
All of the Lords concluded that the relevant legal framework
was one of breach of confidence, bar Lord Nicholls, dissenting, who
suggested that the time had come to acknowledge that ‘breach of
confidence’ did not truly describe the cause of action on the facts
before him.245 He argued that even though there was no overarching
cause of action for invasion of privacy in English law, the present
case nonetheless concerned an aspect of such an invasion, in this
case the wrongful disclosure of private facts.246 He argued that the
use of a ‘breach of confidence’ action to remedy such an invasion was
a misleading phrase because that cause of action no longer requires
a confidential relationship; instead, “the law imposes a ‘duty of confi-
dence’ whenever a person receives information he knows or ought to
know is fairly and reasonably to be regarded as confidential.” 247 A
better phrase for the tort, he declared, was “misuse of private infor-
mation”;248 he also noted that this did not exhaust private law
privacy interests, but rather it was simply the best descriptor for the
action given the particular facts.249 As to which facts an individual
243. Id. at [2].
244. Id. at [83]–[84].
245. Id. at [17].
246. Id. at [11]–[12].
247. Id. at [14].
248. Campbell, [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 [22] (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.).
It should be noted that Lord Nicholls seems to have ultimately won this nomenclature
battle. In OBG Ltd. v. Allan, [2007] UKHL 21, [2007] Bus LR 1600 [255] (Eng.), he
argued that the law of confidence incorporated two distinct causes of action that pro-
tected two different interests—privacy and confidential information. In Vidal-Hall v.
Google, Inc., [2014] EWHC 13, [2014] QB 201 [64]–[67], this was cited with approval by
the Court of Appeal as evidence that ‘misuse of private information’ was to be treated
as a distinct tort from breach of confidence, even though they grew from the same legal
concept. However, since the U.K. Supreme Court has not yet pronounced on the nomen-
clature issue post-Vidal-Hall, I will continue to refer to it in the remainder of this Article
as a breach of confidence action in the service of privacy interests.
249. Campbell, [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 [14].
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had a right against such misuse, Lord Nicholls declared it to be those
in which the person had “a reasonable expectation of privacy.” 250
Interestingly, he rejected the idea that the tort ought to be limited
to disclosure of facts that would be ‘highly offensive,’ suggesting that
considerations about offensiveness are better considered under
matters of proportionality, the later balancing between privacy and
free expression. He ultimately concluded that Campbell had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the photographs because “[t]hey
conveyed no private information beyond that discussed in the [ac-
companying] article,” 251 in which she had no reasonable expectation
of privacy because of her repeated “assertions in public [i.e. to the
media]” that she did not take drugs.252
The other Lords all approached the issue from the standpoint
of a breach of confidence action, though differing in their implemen-
tation. Lord Hoffman, dissenting, began with the premise that under
the HRA/ECHR, individuals have an entitlement to privacy that is
grounded in their dignity.253 While there was no freestanding inva-
sion of privacy tort in English law, he said that this entitlement,
nonetheless, underlays other causes of action.254 Lord Hoffman did
not explain precisely what the ambit of this right to privacy was, but
rather launched into a discussion of the balancing issue between the
competing ECHR provisions as part of the initial question of whether
a legitimate duty of confidence arose over the details of drug treat-
ments and accompanying photographs.255 He acknowledged that while
a non-celebrity might typically have the benefit of a such a duty
because medical treatments were considered private, Campbell did
not due to her own use of the media to create an anti-drug image
persona, paralleling a portion of Lord Nicholls’ dissent.256 This was
a factor that not only tilted the scales in favour of the newspaper’s
Article 10 free expression rights, but also meant that Campbell had
abandoned any legitimate privacy interest in the information she may
previously have had.257 Lord Hoffman also argued that the mere fact
that the photographs were taken without consent was “not enough to
amount to a wrongful invasion of privacy.”258 Only public photographs
that revealed an individual “in a situation of humiliation or severe
250. Id. at [21].
251. Id. at [31].
252. Id. at [24].
253. Id. at [47]–[50].
254. Id. at [43], [50].
255. Campbell, [2004] 2 UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 [44]–[53].
256. Id. at [56]–[58].
257. Id. at [56], [66].
258. Id. at [73].
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embarrassment . . . [might] be an infringement of . . . privacy.” 259 On
the facts before him, Lord Hoffman found that there was nothing
humiliating or severely embarrassing about the photographs.260 The
dissent of Lord Hoffman therefore evinces a notably different ap-
proach than that found in the American model by looking to the
impact on the claimant of the disclosure rather than the nature of
the information itself.
The majority agreed with the basis of Lord Hoffman’s approach,
if not his ultimate analysis. Lord Hope of Craighead wrote the first
of the three separate opinions that together formed the majority in
the result, and began by holding that “the details of Miss Campbell’s
attendance at Narcotics Anonymous [were] private information which
imported a duty of confidence.” 261 He made reference to the Ameri-
can model but concluded its adoption was unnecessary, instead
leaning towards a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test to deter-
mine whether the necessary quality of confidence existed.262 For
Lord Hope, information is “obviously private” where an individual
can “reasonably expect his privacy to be respected.” 263 What is more,
in cases where the information was not “obviously private” (or,
where there was no reasonable expectation of privacy), the question
of whether the disclosure was nonetheless “highly offensive” is not
whether the “reasonable man of ordinary susceptibilities” would be
offended upon reading about the information (he declares such an
approach to be “an error”), but rather how “a reasonable person of
ordinary sensibilities would feel if she was placed in the same posi-
tion as the claimant and faced with the same publicity.”264 Here then,
just as in Lenah Game Meats (to which Lord Hope also referred), we
see an important distinction between the concept of ‘offensiveness’
as it exists within the freestanding American tort and as it exists in
an expanded breach of confidence action—the latter appears to focus
on the effects of the disclosure rather than on the nature or type of
the information.
Unlike Lord Hope, Lady Hale of Richmond rejected the need for
a “highly offensive” threshold test entirely, instead adopting what
she described as “[an] objective reasonable expectation [of privacy]
test [that] is . . . clearer,” 265 still existing within an expanded breach
of confidence action.266 She also suggested, as did Lord Hope, that
259. Id. at [75].
260. Campbell, [2004] 2 UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 [76].
261. Id. at [95].
262. Id. at [99].
263. Id. at [96].
264. Id. at [99].
265. Id. at [135].
266. Campbell, [2004] 2 UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 [132].
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an individual automatically had such an expectation over any
situation that “was obviously private,” and went on to conclude that
all of the information at issue was “both private and confidential,
because it related to an important aspect of Miss Campbell’s physi-
cal and mental health.” 267 Thus, while “[t]here is nothing essentially
private about . . . [Miss Campbell] going about her business in a
public street,” 268 the captioning of the photos that explained she was
attending a Narcotics Anonymous meeting meant “these photo-
graphs were different,” largely because they might deter her from
continuing with an important treatment programme.269 It was “[t]he
risk of harm . . . [that] matter[ed] at this stage, rather than the
proof that actual harm [had] occurred.” 270 Thus, though she rejected
the need to address the question of whether or not the disclosure
was ‘highly offensive,’ her approach nonetheless ultimately focused
on the same questions as had Lord Hope’s: the effects (or potential
effects) suffered by the claimant as a result of the disclosure.271 Lord
Carswell effectively agreed with both Lord Hope and Lady Hale’s
approach on the harm suffered as a result of the disclosure, finding
that “[p]ublication of the details of the appellant’s attendance in
therapy . . . [constituted] a considerable intrusion into her private
affairs,” causing her substantial distress.272
The Lords often make reference in Campbell to foreign jurispru-
dence regarding privacy torts, sometimes importing language about
reasonable expectations of privacy or disclosure of offensive facts—
the expansion of the action to include information as between parties
who have no pre-existing relationship has required the importation
of such limiting devices.273 But as shown, even where such language
is imported, it is never done in the service of giving primacy to
spatial/locational questions. The expanded breach of confidence ac-
tion in Campbell and Lenah Game Meats represents, then, a differ-
ent method of protecting privacy in tort law that looks to the nature
of the harm suffered by plaintiff as the determining factor, rather
than to spatial questions about their location or decision to share
information with some but not others. Though Markesinis et al.
have described the continued reliance upon the confidence action in
Campbell, rather than a full development of a tort of invasion of
267. Id. at [147].
268. Id. at [154].
269. Id. at [155].
270. Id. at [157].
271. Id. at [134].
272. Campbell, [2004] 2 UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 [169].
273. See also A v. B plc [2002] EWCA Civ 337, [2003] Q.B. 195 [11] (Eng.) (suggesting
judicial guidelines that considers the reasonableness of a public f igure’s expectation of
privacy).
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privacy, as “incoheren[t]” and nothing more than a “tentative smug-
gling of privacy rights via the back-door,” 274 it may in fact be a
valuable way of responding to the ‘containment anxiety’ problem
without reliance on the classic binary approach to privacy interests.
The conception of privacy elucidated in Campbell—though not
described by the Lords as such—better accords with the ‘relational
perspective’ I have advanced. The privacy violation was in part due
to removing from the claimant her ability to adequately negotiate
the extent of her engagement with the community and act in an
autonomous manner. The decision focused not where the privacy
loss occurred, but on the impact it had on the claimant in living her
life as she saw fit.275 In Campbell, the very name of the treatment
programme the claimant entered—Narcotics Anonymous—empha-
sized the need for addicts to be able to share their experiences with
others in treatment with nonetheless an expectation of privacy that
the information she shared or even her attempts to seek treatment
would not be shared beyond that group. The claimant could not
pursue treatment for a serious drug addiction alone—she required
the support of a group to do so, but in turn needed to be able to
share her experience with that group without fear of this informa-
tion being shared globally. There could be no more obvious demon-
stration of the importance of relational privacy. The loss of this
privacy, then, threatened to have a real impact on her capacity for
truly autonomous action and her role in the community. Under the
American framework and its associated reliance on the boundary
approach, it is likely that her claim would have failed, despite the
impact of the privacy loss. But the logic of Campbell still allows for
privacy claims to be made over ‘public’ matters only in the most
serious of circumstances. The majority of the Lords placed signifi-
cant emphasis on the physical and mental harm that could befall
the claimant if she relapsed into drug use if she avoided treatment
so as to avoid publicity.276 Thus, the tort is still sufficiently bounded
so as to avoid ‘containment anxiety.’ The advantages of this ap-
proach have also been recognized by the Ontario Superior Court of
Justice in the recent case of Doe v. N.D.277 The anonymous plaintiff
and the defendant, N.D., had at one point been in an intimate re-
lationship that led to the consensual creation of several sexually
explicit videos.278 The defendant then uploaded one of these to a
274. Markesinis et al., supra note 241, at 208.
275. See Campbell, [2004] 2 UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 [89]–[92] (Lord Hope of
Craighead).
276. See, e.g., id. at [95] (Lord Hope).
277. Doe 464533 v. N.D., 2016 ONSC 541 (Can.).
278. Id. at paras. 5–7.
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pornographic website without the plaintiff’s consent.279 Upon discov-
ering this, the plaintiff successfully had the video removed from the
website, though there was no way to know how many times it had
been viewed or downloaded in the three weeks the process took.280
The court accepted that this led to the plaintiff suffering tremen-
dous harm, finding her to be “emotionally fragile and worried about
the possibility that the video may someday resurface and have an
adverse impact on her employment, her career, or her future rela-
tionships.” 281 Stinson J. found that a breach of confidence was made
out; for the first time in Canadian law it had been used to support
a non-commercial privacy interest:
The third element of the tort, use of the information to the detri-
ment of the party communicating it, is ordinarily considered in
commercial circumstances, where the recipient has misused the
confidential information for commercial advantage, at the ex-
pense or to the detriment of the other party. An essential element
in any tort is harm to the plaintiff. I see no rational basis to dis-
tinguish between economic harm and psychological, emotional
and physical harm, such as was experienced by the plaintiff in
the present case. In any event, the possible future adverse im-
pact on the plaintiff’s career and employment prospects arising
from the possibility that the video may someday resurface, also
demonstrates actionable harm.282
In so doing, Stinson J. adopted a similar approach to the breach
of confidence action as the House of Lords had in Campbell—a focus
on the harm suffered by the plaintiff and the impact it had or will
have upon her ability to lead the life she wishes rather than simply
on the nature of the information at issue. Interestingly, Stinson J.
also found that a claim could be made out on a version of the second
branch of the American four-part framework (publicity given to
private facts), applying it for the first time in Ontario (recall that
Jones dealt only with the first branch—intrusion upon seclusion).283
However, Stinson J. modified the tort so that, unlike in its Ameri-
can formulation, the issue of offensiveness went to either the act of
publication or to the nature of the matter.284 The version found in
the Restatement of Torts looks only to the nature of the matter.285
By making this alteration, much as the Australian High Court did
279. Id. at para. 8.
280. Id. at para. 10.
281. Id. at para. 14.
282. Id. at para. 24.
283. Doe 464533 v. N.D., 2016 ONSC 541, para. 41–48.
284. Id. at para. 46.
285. See id.
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in Lenah Game Meats, Stinson J. was able to again incorporate a
stronger focus on the impact of the privacy loss on the claimant and
her relationships, rather than looking only at the type of material
revealed. It is also important to note that the success of this claim
under the third branch was dependent on the publicity aspect—the
defendant had uploaded the video to a publicly accessible website.286
The commentary to the Restatement of Torts notes that
“Publicity,” on the other hand, means that the matter is made
public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many
persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain
to become one of public knowledge. The difference is not one of
the means of communication, which may be oral, written or by
any other means. It is one of a communication that reaches, or
is sure to reach, the public. Thus it is not an invasion of the right
of privacy, within the rule stated in this Section, to communicate
a fact concerning the plaintiff’s private life to a single person or
even to a small group of persons.287
Stinson J. did not give this specific interpretation to the mean-
ing of publicity as it was not necessary to do so, though he did refer
directly to other elements of the Restatements commentary to ex-
plain the history of the action, suggesting future actions under this
tort in Ontario will likely hew closely to it.288 This is problematic for
other forms of revenge porn, however. Under such an interpretation,
had the defendant shown the video to a group friends but not al-
lowed them to make copies, then the publicity aspect of the third
branch likely would not be made out. The claim would therefore fail,
regardless of the emotional harms suffered by the plaintiff. This too,
then, is a reflection of a conventional boundary approach to privacy—
the requirement for publicity is effectively a tool for the courts to
ensure that the material over which a privacy interest is claimed
has in fact transgressed the boundary. An expanded breach of con-
fidence action need not suffer from this same defect since it looks
more to the harm suffered and thus, in my view, has a greater
chance of incorporating a relational account of privacy.
CONCLUSION
I have argued in this Article that the current interpretation by
the courts of the four-part framework found in the Restatement of
286. See id. at para. 47.
287. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (emphasis
removed).
288. Doe 464533 v. N.D., 2016 ONSC 541, para. 42.
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Torts is inadequate in the face of modern privacy challenges that
relate to some claim for privacy over public matters or otherwise
non-secret matters. This weakness stems from a dichotomous ap-
proach to privacy, grounded in a liberal-individualistic account of
autonomy.289 Feminist legal theory, however, offers us a superior
account of autonomy that nonetheless preserves its value as tradition-
ally understood in the liberal paradigm.290 This account is grounded
in the importance of supportive social contexts rather than the elimi-
nation of external influence in protecting and nourishing auton-
omy.291 Because of the deep philosophical linkage between autonomy
and privacy, I have argued that the feminist reconstruction of auton-
omy can significantly improve our account of privacy. This new
account—relational privacy—sees privacy losses as things which re-
duce our ability to negotiate our level of exposure to or desired level
of engagement with those around us. In turn, privacy losses that
ought to be deemed actionable by the legal system are those where
the harms that flow from them can be interpreted as threatening our
capacities for autonomous action to such an extent that they in ef-
fect damage our place or role within our chosen community. Though
the courts have not yet recognized this approach by name, the seeds
of it can be found in the expansion of the breach of confidence action
used in some common law jurisdictions to protect privacy interests.292
This expansion has taken an action previously applicable only in the
commercial context, and by focusing on the nature of the harm suf-
fered by the claimant/plaintiff, has expanded privacy protections in
a way that may in fact be more responsive to a range of modern pri-
vacy claims than the traditional freestanding privacy torts used in
the United States and replicas of them elsewhere.
289. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 116, at 486.
290. See, e.g., Kupfer, supra note 162, at 595.
291. See NEDELSKY, supra note 118, 55.
292. See, e.g., ABC v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199 (Austl.); Spencer
v. United Kingdom [1998] 25 EHRR CD 105; Campbell v. Mirror Group [2004] UKHL
22, [2004] 2 AC 457 (Eng.).
